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Abstract 
Sharing economy, which leverages information technology to re-distribute unused or 
underutilized assets to people who are willing to pay for the services, has received 
tremendous attention in the last few years. Its creative business model has disrupted 
many traditional industries (e.g., transportation, hotel) by fundamentally changing the 
mechanism to facilitate the matching of demand with supply in real time. In this research, 
we investigate how Uber, a peer-to-peer mobile ride-sharing platform, affects traffic 
congestion in the urban areas of the United States. Combining data from Uber and the 
Urban Mobility Report, we empirically examine whether and how the entry of Uber car 
services affect traffic congestion using a difference-in-difference framework. Findings 
from this research provide evidence on the potential effect of ride sharing services in the 
transportation industry, contributing to the understanding of the sharing economy and 
government policy decisions. 
Keywords:  Uber, sharing economy, ride sharing, platforms, traffic congestion,  
induced demand, difference in difference 
 
“Sharing is to ownership what the iPod is to the eight-track, what the solar panel to the coal mine. Sharing 
is clean, crisp, urbane, postmodern; Owning is dull, selfish, timid, backward.”  
— Mark Levine, New York Times 
Introduction 
Sharing economy, also referred to as collaborative consumption, gig economy or collaborative economy, 
has received tremendous attention in recent years. The concept was first articulated (Benkler 2002) when 
the Harvard law professor published a paper suggesting that we share goods in economic process. Many 
studies subsequently explored the potential of the collaborative consumption (Avital et al. 2014; Botsman 
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and Rogers 2011; Felländer et al. 2015; Sundararajan 2013, 2014). In 2011, TIME magazine named 
collaborative consumption one of the “Ten ideas that will change the world”. According to Price Waterhouse 
Cooper, in the year 2015-2016, sharing economy sectors generate $15bn in global revenues.  
The transformative force of the sharing economy business model, however, has also raised challenges for 
incumbent industries and regulators. Traditional mature industries such as hotel and automotive industries 
were disrupted because consumers now have convenient and cost efficient access to resources without the 
financial, emotional, or social burdens of ownership (Eckhardt and Bardhi 2015). As the popularity of 
sharing economy grows, it also raised debates on regulatory and safety concerns (Feeney 2015; Malhotra 
and Van Alstyne 2014). Many traditional companies have flocked to regulators and politicians, and lobbied 
them to stop the growth of the sharing economy (Wallsten 2015).  
As one of the most successful examples of the sharing economy, Uber has raised the most heated debates. 
Advocates view Uber services as an important complement to the existing modes of urban transportation. 
Others criticize that sharing economy platforms often restructure the nature of employment and circumvent 
regulations in order to maximize company benefits. Uber, for instance, hires drivers as “independent 
contractors” not “employees”, so their basic rights as labors are not guaranteed. Figure 1 shows a map of 
the worldwide cities where Uber operates and where it is banned or is being challenged.  
 
Figure 1. Where Uber operates, and where it’s been shut down 
The impact of Uber on urban traffic congestion is one of those hotly debated topics in the media. Traffic 
congestion has become a serious social problem as population grows, especially in metropolitan areas. 
According to 2015 Urban Mobility Report,1 Travel delays due to congestion caused drivers to waste more 
than 3 billion gallons of fuel and kept travelers stuck in their cars for nearly 7 billion extra hours – 42 hours 
per rush-hour commuter. Does Uber play a role in urban area traffic congestion? There are two 
countervailing arguments. On one hand, by providing more convenient, less expensive ride sharing services, 
Uber diverts non-driving trips like walking, transit, or cycling to driving mode. Hence, Uber induces 
additional traffic volume and increases traffic congestion. On the other hand, as a car sharing service, Uber 
has the potential to reduce traffic by diverting trips otherwise made in private, single occupancy cars or 
taxis. A few studies have looked into this issue, but the findings are inconclusive. One study from New York 
                                                             
1 http://d2dtl5nnlpfr0r.cloudfront.net/tti.tamu.edu/documents/mobility-scorecard-2015-wappx.pdf 
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Times2 estimated that Uber vehicles contribute to about 10 percent of traffic in Manhattan during evening 
rush hour, but contended that it’s hard to parse the exact impact of Uber on overall traffic increase due to 
the concept of “induced demand” and “fundamental law of traffic congestion”. In a separate study3, the 
Office of the Mayor in New York City released a report in January 2016, highlighting that the city mayor’s 
contention that Uber vehicles and other ride-hailing services had worsened traffic in Manhattan is not 
founded.4   The same report attributed recent slower traffic in Manhattan to population growth, more 
tourists and an increase in deliveries and street construction, but noted that e-dispatch ride-share service 
providers could drive modest growth in congestion in the future. In summary, there is limited empirical 
evidence to validate arguments on either side without comprehensive data and rigorous research.  
In this study, we use a natural experiment approach to empirically examine the impact of Uber on traffic 
congestion in different urban areas of the United States. This research design offers us an important 
advantage: Since the time of Uber entry into various urban areas is different, we can use a difference-in-
difference method to investigate whether the traffic congestion before and after Uber entry is different 
across different urban areas. Our data come from multiple sources. First, the urban mobility report contains 
different elements of congestion data for each of the 101 urban areas in the United States from 1982 to 2014. 
Additionally, we conduct comprehensive due diligence research and collect the entry time of Uber into an 
urban area from Uber's official web site. In order to control the possible effects of other variables, we also 
collected data on fuel cost, socio-economic characteristics of the urban areas, characteristics of road 
transport systems from United States Census Bureau and Bureau of Economic Analysis. After integrating 
data from these sources, we construct an urban area-year level panel data set that includes 957 observations 
spanning 11 years over 87 urban areas in the United States.  
We find empirical evidence that the entry of Uber actually leads to a significant decrease in traffic 
congestion and carbon dioxide emissions in the urban areas of the United States. Moreover, these results 
are consistent for different measures of the traffic congestion. To assess the robustness of the results, we 
perform further analysis including the use of instrumental variables (IV), alternative measures, and more 
granular data. We provide a few plausible underlining mechanisms to help explain our findings. This paper 
contributes to the existing literature by providing additional empirical evidence of the social benefits 
associated with the sharing economy. Additionally, it offers valuable insights about the broader impact of 
ride-sharing services on the transportation industry. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature on the digital 
infrastructure and platforms. Section 3 describe in detail the data and our econometric specifications. 
Section 4 presents our findings as well as additional robustness checks. In Section 5, we discuss our results 
and provide a few underlining mechanisms to explain the results. Section 6 concludes and provides 
directions for future research. 
Related Literature 
Sharing Economy 
Sharing economy has recently become an important research topic. Leveraging the latest information 
technology—smartphones, GPS, payment systems, identification, and feedback mechanisms, sharing 
economy platforms efficiently connect providers who have unused and underexploited assets with 
consumers who are willing to pay for it (Wallsten 2015). It serves unmet demand of fast, flexible, convenient 
and cost effective services, which traditional industry could not satisfy (Rayle et al. 2014; Rempel 2014). 
Participants are important driving force for this new economy. Research shows that people’s motivations 
                                                             
2 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/upshot/blame-uber-for-congestion-in-manhattan-not-so-
fast.html 
3 http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/operations/downloads/pdf/For-Hire-Vehicle-Transportation-Study.pdf 
4 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/nyregion/uber-not-to-blame-for-rise-in-manhattan-traffic-
congestion-report-says.html 
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to participate in collaborative consumption include sustainability, enjoyment of the activity as well as 
economic gains (Hamari et al. 2015).  
Early empirical studies investigated the impact of the emerging business models on traditional industries. 
For example, Zervas et al. (2014) estimate that each 10% increase in Airbnb supply results in a 0.37% 
decrease in monthly hotel room revenue. Wallsten (2015) explores the competitive effects of ride-sharing 
on the taxi industry and finds that Uber’s popularity decreases the consumer complaints per trip about taxi 
in New York and decreases specific types of complaints about taxi in Chicago. Greenwood and Wattal (2015) 
find that Uber decreases the rate of alcohol related motor vehicle homicides. Burtch et al. (2016) examine 
how the entry of platforms influences rates of entrepreneurial activities. Rayle et al. (2014) surveyed ride-
sharing users in San Francisco to investigate the difference of trips and user characteristics between taxi 
and on-demand ride services. The authors highlighted that the impacts of ride sharing on overall vehicle 
miles traveled and traffic congestion are unclear. 
Digital Infrastructure and Platforms 
Digital infrastructure and platforms bring together people, information, and technology to support business 
practices, social and economic activities, research, and collective action in civic matters (Adner and Kapoor 
2010; Au and Kauffman 2008; Constantinides and Barrett 2014; Tilson et al. 2010).  On one hand, by 
connecting the seller and the buyer, platforms increase market efficiency and reduce transaction cost 
(Bailey and Bakos 1997). On the other hand, platforms increase information transparency in markets by 
reducing information asymmetries (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003). Williamson (1981) argued that platforms 
increase price transparency and thereby reduce commerce friction. By increasing information transparency 
and facilitating the exchange process of goods and services, platforms create buyer surplus, seller surplus 
and thus societal well-fare.  
There has been extensive research on digital infrastructure and platforms. Here we review only a few recent 
studies on the effects of digital platforms. Seamans and Zhu (2013) investigate the impact of Craigslist on 
three different sides of newspaper markets: newspaper side, subscriber side and display-ad side. Rhue 
(2015) examines the racial dynamics in the crowdfunding platform Kickstarter. Parker et al. (2016) find 
that Reuters Market Light, a text message service in India, reduces geographic price dispersion and 
increases the rate at which prices converge over time. Chan and Ghose (2013) investigate whether the entry 
of Craigslist increases the prevalence of HIV. Bapna et al. (2013) estimate the causal effect of one specific 
characteristic of an online dating website. Burtch et al. (2013) examine both the antecedents and the 
consequences of the contribution process in a crowd-funding platform. Greenwood and Agarwal (2015) find 
evidence on how the entry of matching platforms influences the incidence rate of HIV infection by race, 
gender, and socioeconomic status.    
Traffic Congestion 
Traffic congestion occurs when the demand for space is greater than the available road capacity. Slower 
speeds, longer trip times, and increased vehicular queues are all characteristics of traffic congestion. Traffic 
congestion has been a central problem in the transportation literature (Cervero and Hansen 2002; Goodwin 
1996). Downs (1962) describes the “fundamental law of highway congestion” to explain why increasing road 
capacity will not reduce congestion but make it worse. This theory is also known as “induced traffic”, or 
more generally referred to as “latent demand.” (Leeming and Mackay 1969). Duranton and Turner (2011) 
confirmed the theory by providing evidence that increased provision of roads or public transit is unlikely to 
relieve congestion. Ample research studies have been conducted to estimate new traffic after the opening 
of some facilities or after a capacity expansion (Cervero and Hansen 2002; Goodwin 1996).  
Some pioneering studies have examined the impact of car sharing on traffic congestion. For example, 
Alexander and González (2015) explored how ridesharing influences traffic congestion using mobile phone 
data and found that under moderate to high adoption rate scenarios, ridesharing would likely have 
noticeable effects in reducing congested travel times. Survey research in San Francisco reveals that although 
ridesharing substitutes longer transit trips, it does complement transit (Rayle et al. 2014). Fellows and 
Pitfield (2000) point out that encouraging ride-sharing may reduce vehicle miles travelled. Jacobson and 
King (2009) investigated the potential fuel savings in the US when ride-sharing policy was announced and 
found that if 10% cars were to have more than one passenger, it could reduce 5.4% annual fuel consumption. 
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Caulfield (2009) estimated the environmental benefits of ride-sharing in Dublin and found that 12,674t of 
CO2 emissions were saved by individual ride-sharing. Fellows and Pitfield (2000) examined the potential 
of ride-sharing to alleviate congestion and pollution and found evidence of its impact on reduction in vehicle 
kilometers, increase in average speeds and savings in fuel, accidents and emissions.  
Data and Methods 
Research Setting 
Uber is the most successful ride-share platform and the representative start-up of the sharing economy. 
Officially launched in San Francisco in 2011, Uber has grown up from a small start-up company in Silicon 
Valley to an international corporation with billions of funding.  By April 12, 2016, Uber was available in over 
60 countries and 404 cities worldwide. The creative model of Uber has made it possible for people to simply 
tap their smartphone and have a cab arrive at their location in the minimum possible time. The whole 
process is extremely convenient. When the customer opens the app, they choose a ride (UberX, UberBlack, 
UberSUV and so on), set their location. The customer will see the driver’s picture and vehicle details , and 
can track their arrival on the map. The pay process is “no cash, no tip and no hassle”. If the current time 
period is peak demand time, the customer will face surge pricing. But they are notified before making the 
decision, as shown in the Figure 2. After that, the consumer can rate the driver and provide anonymous 
feedback about his/her trip experience. 
             
Figure 2. Ride Share Using Uber and Surge Pricing 
Data 
In order to investigate the effect of Uber entry on urban area traffic congestion, we integrate the Uber entry 
time into major U.S. metropolitan areas, retrieved directly from the official Uber website, with congestion 
data from the Urban Mobility Report, provided by the Texas A&M Transportation Institute (TTI). The 
Urban Mobility Report contains the urban mobility and congestion statistics for each of the 101 urban areas 
in the U.S. from 1982 to 2014. This report is acknowledged as the most authoritative source of information 
about traffic congestion and is widely used in the transportation literature. The comprehensive and 
longitudinal traffic-related data allow us to explore the change in urban traffic congestions due to external 
shocks (e.g. the entry of Uber). After merging the data sets, our final data set comprises 957 observations 
957 observations spanning 11 years over 87 urban areas in the United States.  
Dependent variables 
We adopted a few variables (See Table 1) from the Urban Mobility Report to measure traffic congestion. 
The first one is the Travel Time Index (TTI). Many studies have used the TTI as a measure of traffic 
congestion (Bertini 2005; Hagler and Todorovich 2009; Litman 2007; Mehran and Nakamura 2009; Sweet 
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and Chen 2011; Zhang 2011). In the Urban Mobility Report, the Travel Time Index refers to the ratio of 
travel time in the peak period to travel time at free-flow conditions and is computed as:  
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
                                                                                               (1) 
The Commuter Stress Index (CSI), another measure for traffic congestion, is the travel time index calculated 
for only the peak direction in the each peak period. The CSI is said to be more indicative of the work trip 
experienced by each commuter on a daily basis 5. Both the TTI and the CSI are travel indices and do not 
represent the actual time of delay due to congestion. Hence we adopted the daily vehicle hours of delay to 
measure the amount of extra time spent travelling due to congestion.      
𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 = (
𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑
) − (
𝐷𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑉𝑒ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒
𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙
𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑
)                                                             (2) 
The Annual Delay per Auto Commuter is a measure of the extra travel time endured throughout the year 
by auto commuters who make trips during the peak period. The delay that occurs during the peak hours of 
the day is assigned to the pool of commuters. The delay that occurs outside of the peak period is assigned 
to the entire population of the urban area. Equation (3) shows how the delay per auto commuter is 
calculated. Note that the off-peak delay is also considered because trips not only occur during peak hours 
but also during other times of the weekdays and the weekends. 
𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑢𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑟 = (
𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦
𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠
) − (
𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
)                                                                      (3) 
In addition to the time dimension of traffic congestion, we also consider the value of the travel time delay, 
namely the congestion (or delay) cost. The total congestion cost takes into account of both the cost of 
delayed time and the cost of wasted fuel. Table 2 describes the summary statistics of the dependent 
variables. It should be noted these variables are not normally distributed and the log transformations are 
used in our later analysis.  
Dependent Variable Description 
TTI The ratio of travel time in the peak period to travel time at free-flow 
conditions 
Delay Cost annual congestion cost total dollars(million) 
Delay Cost per auto annual congestion cost per auto commuter($) 
Delay Time annual hours of delay in thousand 
Delay Time per auto annual hours of delay per auto commuter   
CSI commuter stress index 
Table 1. Description of Dependent Variables 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
CSI 957 1.244681 0.1042578   1.07 1.64 
Delay Cost(million)   957 1552.794    2492.025   70   16346 
Delay Cost per auto 
(dollars) 
957 6.688595 1.077973 4.248495 9.701738 
Delay Time 
(in thousand) 
957 61401.17 99993.65 2035   630722 
Delay Time per auto 957 10.34483 1.098944 7.618251 13.35462 
Excess Fuel 
(total gallons) 
957 27461.53   41443.97 1106 296701 
                                                             
5 David Schrank, Bill Eisele, Tim Lomax, Jim Bak, “2015 Urban Mobility Scorecard,” Texas Transportation 
Institute, http://d2dtl5nnlpfr0r.cloudfront.net/tti.tamu.edu/documents/mobility-scorecard-2015.pdf. 
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Excess Fuel per auto 
(gallons) 
957 18.35423 5.260665   5 35 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables 
Control Variables 
We control the effects of a number of variables including lane miles of road and the amount of travelers, 
which have been identified as important variables to explain traffic congestion in the transportation 
economic literature. Additionally, we control for the variables that may play a role in Uber’s decision to 
enter different urban areas/cities. These variables include population size, socio-economic status (such as 
GDP, median income) of different cities. Table 3 describes the control variables used in our study. The 
summary statistics of the control variables are shown in Table 4.  
Control Variable Description Source 
POP Population  
 
 
) 
T&A Urban Mobility Report 
SOCIOECON GDP in current dollars Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 Median Income  
ROAD Freeway Lane-miles T&A Urban Mobility Report 
Arterial Lane-miles 
TRAVELLER Commuter (thousands) 
Table 3. Descriptions of Control Variables 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
GDP 957   119241.5 181231.5   3641    1423173 
Population 957 1820.846 2619.381   105 19040 
Median Income 957 48443.67 8163.061 32875   76165 
Freeway lane miles 957 16344.17 21505.79 480 139275 
Arterial lane miles 957 16103.52 20183.7 988 126010 
Commuter(thousand) 957 825.2027   976.1309     51   5928 
Diesel Cost 957 3.254242 0.6863275   1.77 4.91 
Gasoline Cost 957 2.921703 0.5604156   1.77   4.35 
Table 4. Summary Statistics of Control Variables 
Empirical Estimation 
As discussed earlier, the time of Uber’s entry into various urban areas is different. Therefore we use a 
difference-in-difference method to investigate the causal effect of Uber’s entry on traffic congestion. 
Difference-in-Difference estimation has become an increasingly popular way to estimate causal 
relationships (Bertrand et al. 2002). It is appropriate when one wants to compare the difference in 
outcomes after and before the intervention for the treated groups to the same difference for the un-treated 
groups. In order to control the ex-ante differences between the heterogeneous urban areas, we include 
group fixed effects in our model specification. Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation: 
ln(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛿(𝑈𝑏𝑒𝑟_𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝜆(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡) +  𝜃𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡      (1) 
We estimate the model with various dependent variables (congestion measures) described in Table 1. 
Controlsi,t represent measurements of variables described in Table 3 for urban area i in year t. Uber entry 
is a dummy variable. It equals to 1 when the urban area 𝑖 has the Uber service in year 𝑡. The parameters 𝜃 
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and 𝛿 represent the time fixed effect and the urban area fixed effect. Fixed effects capture not only non-time 
varying factors but also allow the error term to be arbitrarily correlated with other explanatory variables, 
thus making the estimation results more robust. 𝜀 is the error term. We use robust standard errors clustered 
at the urban areas to deal with potential issues of heteroscedasticity. 
Results 
Tables 5 and 6 summarize our main results. Each column presents the effect of Uber entry as well as the 
effect of the control variables for a different measurement of traffic congestion. It can be seen that the effect 
of Uber entry is pretty consistent. The estimate of the effect (except on TTI and Excess fuel per auto) is 
significant and negative. We would like to highlight that the estimate of Uber entry on TTI is negative and 
the p value of the estimate is 0.12, hence marginally significant given our sample size is only 957. The 
estimate of Uber entry on Excess fuel per auto is insignificant and positive (p = 0.615). Overall we find 
reasonable evidence that the entry of Uber significantly decreases traffic congestion in the urban areas of 
the U.S. It is also worth to note that as the median income in an urban area increases, the traffic tends to 
get worse. This is consistent with the existing traffic literature that traffic conditions in a city are usually 
associated with the overall economic activities.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variables TTI CSI Log(Delay Cost) Delay Cost per auto 
Uber Entry -0.00237 -0.00377*** -0.0121** -27.32*** 
 (0.00151) (0.00139) (0.00600) (7.271) 
GDP 0.000364 0.000457 0.00391 3.337 
 (0.000776) (0.000697) (0.00297) (3.424) 
Income 0.0515*** 0.0580*** 0.255*** 218.7*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0139) (0.0696) (59.51) 
Population -0.0230 -0.0274 0.117 9.995 
 (0.0390) (0.0391) (0.141) (188.5) 
Commuters -0.0316 -0.0325 0.603*** 739.8*** 
 (0.0400) (0.0408) (0.153) (194.6) 
Gasoline Cost -0.00336 -0.00919 -0.0505 -48.53 
 (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0573) (54.28) 
Diesel Cost 0.0169 0.0138 0.112 163.9** 
 (0.0154) (0.0157) (0.0889) (78.98) 
Freeway  Lane-miles 0.00828 0.00780 0.0748 55.72 
 (0.0138) (0.0148) (0.0659) (69.97) 
Arterial Lane-miles 0.0185** 0.0130 0.0733* 86.16* 
 (0.00877) (0.00841) (0.0436) (45.61) 
Constant 0.745*** 0.815*** -1.985 -7,355*** 
 (0.276) (0.286) (1.312) (1,265) 
Time fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 957 957 957 957 
R-squared 0.241 0.262 0.478 0.538 
Number of urban areas 87 87 87 87 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses                           *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 5. Estimation Results of Uber Entry on Traffic Congestion 
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 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent Variables Log(Delay 
Time) 
Delay Time 
per auto 
Log(Excess 
Fuel) 
 Excess Fuel 
Per auto 
Uber Entry -0.0121** -0.491* -0.0121** 0.210 
 (0.00599) (0.252) (0.00599) (0.133) 
GDP 0.00388 0.127 0.00389 0.0652 
 (0.00297) (0.145) (0.00297) (0.0820) 
Income 0.256*** 9.673*** 0.256*** 4.746*** 
 (0.0692) (2.416) (0.0692) (1.166) 
Population 0.118 -5.202 0.118 3.555 
 (0.141) (7.546) (0.141) (4.039) 
Commuters 0.599*** -6.314 0.599*** 8.972** 
 (0.153) (7.733) (0.153) (4.112) 
Gasoline Cost -0.0499 -1.067 -0.0498 0.316 
 (0.0573) (2.272) (0.0573) (1.148) 
Diesel Cost 0.113 5.160* 0.113 1.991 
 (0.0891) (2.621) (0.0891) (1.285) 
Freeway  Lane-miles 0.0759 2.361 0.0760 -0.329 
 (0.0660) (2.561) (0.0660) (1.136) 
Arterial Lane-miles 0.0742* 3.202* 0.0742* 1.181 
 (0.0436) (1.710) (0.0436) (0.821) 
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.534 -42.70 0.784 -124.0*** 
 (1.307) (45.01) (1.307) (21.82) 
Observations 957 957 957 957 
R-squared 0.687 0.292 0.687 0.648 
Number of urban areas 87 87 87 87 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses            *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Table 6. Estimation Results of Uber Entry on Traffic Congestion (cont’d) 
Instrumental Variables 
In order to address the issue of endogeneity, we identified an instrumental variables (IV) to further assess 
the causal relationship between Uber and the traffic congestion. The IV we used is the unemployment rate. 
From the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, we collected data on the unemployment rate of 87 urban 
areas from 2004 to 2014. This variable serves as a valid instrument because it is not likely to be correlated 
with the traffic congestion, but is an important factor for Uber executives to consider when deciding a go-
to market strategy. A unique feature of Uber's business model is that it provides flexible job opportunities 
that attract independent contractors to participate in the labor market. Hence, Uber may be well received 
in areas with higher unemployment rates. 
Following Angrist and Pischke (2008), we estimate the IV model with the 2SLS approach. Specially, we 
estimate the probability that Uber enters an urban area using the standard linear probability approach and 
then included it in the second stage estimation. Table 7 reports the results of this analysis, providing further 
empirical evidence of our main results. We report the first stage results and the fit statistics in Table 8. It 
can be seen that there is a significant correlation between the IV (unemployment rate) and the Uber entry 
time (p = 0.018). Additionally, the first stage F statistics are all significant. Both the Cragg–Donald Wald F 
statistics and the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic pass the critical value suggested by Stock and Yogo 
(2005), alleviating the weak instrument concern. 
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Table 7. 2SLS Estimation Results Using Unemployment Rate as the IV 
 
DV Uber entry 
Unemployment Rate 0.0183763 ** 
 (0.327) 
Control variables Included 
Time and urban area Fixed Effect Yes 
F statistic 5.61* 
Observations 957 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 3.44 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic 5.61 
Table 8. IV First Stage Analysis (Unemployment Rate) 
Alternative Measure for Uber Entry 
So far, we have used Uber entry time to proxy for the implementation of Uber service. This approach has 
limitations. Specifically, after Uber service enters an urban area, it takes time for people to accept and get 
accustomed to this new service. Therefore, Uber entry may not represent the actual usage rate, and there 
may be a time lag between Uber entry and its impact on the traffic congestion. In order to alleviate this 
concern, we use an alternative measure of “Uber Entry” in urban areas: the number of Uber searches in an 
urban area on “Google Trends”. “Google Trends” is a publicly available web application based on Google 
Search. It provides us an index of the popularity of ride-sharing in a certain geographic region. Google 
Trends have been previously demonstrated to track economic activities (retail sales, automotive sales, home 
sales, and travel) in real time (Choi and Varian 2012). Wu and Brynjolfsson (2013) find that Google Trends 
are better in predicting housing sales and prices than traditional indicators.  
We used the “Google Trends” search history of the keyword combination “Uber” + “name of the urban area” 
to measure the popularity and the usage level of Uber in an urban area. It's reasonable to assume that when 
a person search “Uber New York”, she is likely to be interested in the Uber service in the New York City. 
Figure 3 plots the search history of Uber service in three cities:  San Francisco, Phoenix, and Austin along 
with the corresponding actual Uber entry time in each city. We observe that even though Uber entered San 
Francisco in June 2011, it only began to become popular after some time. Similarly, Uber entered Phoenix 
in October 2012, but began to attract public attention around 2014. The correlation between Uber entry 
time and the search volume on Google is positive and significant. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DV TTI CSI ln(Delay 
Cost) 
Delay 
Cost pa 
ln(Delay 
Time) 
Delay Time 
pa 
ln(Excess 
Fuel) 
Excess 
Fuel pa 
Uber Dummy -0.153** -0.168** -0.745** -821** -0.74** -30.8** -0.74** -12.7** 
 (0.067) (0.073) (0.327) (346.1) (0.327) (13.37) (0.327) (5.797) 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Time and area 
fixed effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 957 957 957 957 957 957 957 957 
R-squared -9.152 -10.210 -6.134 -7.092 -3.281 -11.107 -3.283 -3.545 
Number of UR 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 
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Figure 3. Time trends of “Uber + sample urban areas” on Google Trends 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 TTI CSI ln(Delay) paDelay 
Uber Use -0.000421+ -0.000626** -0.0023** -0.0862* 
 (0.000258) (0.000243) (0.00106) (0.0434) 
GDP 0.000373 0.000472 0.00393 0.129 
 (0.000771) (0.000691) (0.00295) (0.144) 
Income 0.0516*** 0.0581*** 0.256*** 9.69*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0139) (0.0691) (2.415) 
Population -0.0221 -0.0267 0.126 -5.035 
 (0.0391) (0.0394) (0.141) (7.581) 
Commuters -0.0323 -0.0331 0.593*** -6.453 
 (0.0401) (0.0411) (0.153) (7.763) 
Gasoline Cost -0.00342 -0.00934 -0.0501 -1.081 
 (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0573) (2.275) 
Diesel Cost 0.0167 0.0136 0.112 5.125* 
 (0.0153) (0.0157) (0.0888) (2.612) 
FDVMT 0.00798 0.00742 0.0740 2.300 
 (0.0138) (0.0148) (0.0660) (2.566) 
ASDVMT 0.0186** 0.0131 0.0751* 3.229* 
 (0.00883) (0.00845) (0.0438) (1.717) 
Constant 0.744*** 0.814*** 1.528 -42.85 
 (0.276) (0.286) (1.304) (44.96) 
Observations 957 957 957 957 
R-squared 0.242 0.262 0.687 0.293 
Number of UR 87 87 87 87 
Table 9. Estimation Results Using Alternative Measure 
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There is, however, a potential issue with the search volume on Google trends. Before Uber actually entered 
an urban area, the search volume is generally not zero in most urban areas. The non-zero search volume 
could represent some expectations and curiosity but not the actual Uber usage. We address this problem by 
multiplying it with the Uber entry dummy variable as a new variable: Uber usage. 
Table 9 and table 10 present the results of our analysis using Uber usage. Once again, we find that our 
estimation results are robust to this alternative measure. 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES lnCost paCost lnFuel paFuel 
Uber Use -0.00231** -4.817*** -0.00231** 0.0283 
 (0.00106) (1.286) (0.00106) (0.0225) 
GDP 0.00395 3.440 0.00393 0.0642 
 (0.00296) (3.373) (0.00295) (0.0822) 
Income 0.256*** 219.7*** 0.256*** 4.737*** 
 (0.0695) (59.33) (0.0691) (1.167) 
Population 0.125 19.63 0.126 3.624 
 (0.141) (189.0) (0.141) (4.049) 
Commuters 0.597*** 731.8*** 0.593*** 8.908** 
 (0.153) (194.7) (0.153) (4.113) 
Gasoline Cost -0.0507 -49.30 -0.0500 0.331 
 (0.0573) (54.43) (0.0573) (1.147) 
Diesel Cost 0.111 161.9** 0.112 1.990 
 (0.0886) (78.39) (0.0888) (1.282) 
FDVMT 0.0729 52.32 0.0741 -0.322 
 (0.0658) (69.84) (0.0660) (1.140) 
ASDVMT 0.0742* 87.67* 0.0751* 1.182 
 (0.0438) (45.90) (0.0438) (0.823) 
Constant -1.991 -7,363*** 0.778 -124.1*** 
 (1.309) (1,261) (1.305) (21.82) 
Observations 957 957 957 957 
R-squared 0.479 0.539 0.687 0.647 
Number of UR 87 87 87 87 
Table 10. Estimation Results Using Alternative Measure (cont’d) 
Discussion 
Our extensive analysis provides empirical evidence of a causal relationship between ride-sharing services 
and traffic congestion. An important question is what mechanism could possibly drive this main result. In 
the following, we offer a few explanations and our insights. 
The first possible explanation is that Uber increases vehicle occupancy, thereby decreasing traffic 
congestion. Given that the number of commuters in an urban area does not grow at a high rate over a short 
period of time, ride sharing can reduce the total number of cars on the road by having more than one person 
in the car. A recent survey (Rayle et al. 2014) found that occupancy levels for ride-sharing vehicles averaged 
1.8 passengers in contrast to 1.1 passengers for taxis in a matched pair analysis. According to the 
International Energy Agency (2005)6, adding one additional person to every commute trip could achieve a 
saving of 7.7% on fuel consumption and a reduction of 12.5% on vehicle miles. 
                                                             
6 http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/media/weowebsite/2008-1994/weo2005.pdf 
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Second, the low cost travel mode of ride sharing reduces car ownership. In a growing number of cities, ride-
sharing services like Uber provide low cost alternatives to car ownership. 7  Take San Francisco as an 
example, ride-sharing services are found to reduce car ownership, encourage more judicious and selective 
use of cars for particular trip purposes (Cervero and Tsai 2004). The availability of ride-sharing services 
also reduces consumers' incentives to purchase automobiles (Rogers 2015). Martin and Shaheen (2011) 
surveyed a sample of 6,281 households and found that each ride-sharing vehicle replaces 9 to 13 vehicles 
(postponed and sold) from the road.  Another recent study of North American ride-sharing organizations 
shows that 15% to 32% of ride-sharing members sold their personal vehicles, and between 25% and 71% of 
members avoided an auto purchase because of ride-sharing.8A recent survey (Murphy 2016) of more than 
4,500 shared mobility users in the seven study cities (Austin, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
Seattle and Washington, DC) also found that people who use more shared modes report lower household 
vehicle ownership and decreased spending on transportation. 
Third, ride-sharing services can shift demand among different traffic modes. Researchers(Meijkamp 1998; 
Munheim 1998; Steininger et al. 1996) found evidence that those who used car sharing services drove 
significantly less than they did before they had used this service. Katzev (2003) conducted three studies on 
the early adopters of Car Sharing Portland and found that this service promoted trip “bundling” and greater 
use of alternative transportation such as bus riding, bicycling, and walking. Martin and Shaheen (2011) 
found that more car sharing users increased their overall public transit and non-motorized modal use.  
Fourth, Uber's surge pricing strategy has the potential to delay or divert peak hour demands. The idea 
behind surge pricing is to adjust prices of rides so as to match driver supply to rider demand at any given 
time. Since the price of ride sharing in peak hours can surge quite high, riders who are price sensitive and 
flexible in their schedule may delay the travel time or choose to use public transit instead.  
Finally, Uber increases vehicle capacity utilization. According to Cramer and Krueger (2016), in most cities, 
the efficiency of Uber is much higher than traditional taxis by having a higher faction of time and a higher 
share of miles having fare-paying passengers in their backseats. Higher capacity utilization means that Uber 
drivers will spend less time wandering streets searching passengers, which reduces excess fuel usage and 
traffic congestion.  
Conclusion  
As sharing economy grows, it is important to look into its potential impacts and implications. This paper 
studies one of the many social issues associated with ride-share services. Specifically, we empirically 
examine how the entry of Uber into major U.S. metropolitan areas influences traffic congestions. By taking 
advantage of the different entry times of Uber into different urban areas, we are able to compare the 
difference in traffic congestion after and before Uber entry for the urban areas where Uber operates to the 
same difference for those urban areas without Uber service. We argue that ride-share service like Uber has 
the potential to reduce car ownership, shift traffic mode from single occupancy to ride sharing, delay travel 
plans in peak hours, thus reducing the overall traffic congestion in an urban area. Using annual congestion 
data from the urban mobility report, we find empirical evidence to support this line of argument.  
This study has several limitations. First, we identify a few mechanisms through which Uber decreases the 
traffic congestion. Data limitations prevent us from directly testing those hypotheses.  We do want to 
highlight that the logics behind our argument have been tested in the transportation literature using survey 
data, mobile phone real time data, and simulations. . Second, our traffic data is aggregated at the annual 
level. More granular level such as quarterly or monthly traffic data might allow us to pinpoint a more robust 
causal relationship. We are in the process to collect detailed traffic data to carry out further analysis. Finally, 
because the sharing economy is a relatively new phenomenon, we are unable to examine the longer term 
consequences of Uber’s entry on traffic congestion. Future work using longer panel data is worth to pursue. 
                                                             
7 http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2014/11/08/ridesharing-lyft-uber/18482083/ 
8 http://www.rmi.org/Content/Files/North\%20American\%20Carsharing\%20-
\%2010\%20Year\%20Retrospective.pdf 
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